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UNCONSCIONABILITY: A NEW HELPING HAND TO
RESIDENTIAL TENANTS
There is growing recognition that real property law, the traditional
framework for the landlord-tenant relationship, has failed to recognize
adequately the rights of the modern residential lessee.1 Tenant self-
sufficiency has given way to dependence on the landlord for both hous-
ing and housing maintenance.2 The shortage of adequate apartments
3
has increased the landlord's bargaining power and allowed the lessor to
use complex form leases replete with clauses favoring himself.4 The
modern residential lease has thus come to resemble an adhesion con-
tract.
5
Some courts have recently responded to this imbalance by applying
the contract theory of unconscionability.6 Unconscionability first ap-
peared in landlord-tenant cases when courts, noting few distinctions
between leases and contracts, applied equitable principles or used con-
tract law to resolve landlord-tenant disputes. Recently, the Restatement
(Second) of Property has recognized the use of unconscionability,7 and
1. See notes 12-13, 25 infra.
2. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Lefrak v. Lambert,
89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. CL 1976), modXed, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397
(Sup. Ct. 1978).
3. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
4. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Avenue Assocs., Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 134, 138-40, 371 N.Y.S.2d 736,
742-44 (Civ. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 83 Misc. 2d 719, 373 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1975);
Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 332, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 687 (Rockland County Ct.), afl'd,
84 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Humbach, Landlord Control of Tenant Behav-
ior.- An Instance ofPrivate Environmental Legislation, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 223, 304 (1976); In-
dritz, The Tenants' Rights Movement, I N. MEx. L. REV. 1, 107 (1971); Schoshinski, Remedies of
the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519, 555-56 (1966); Note, An Attack, on
Confession of Judgment Clauses in Residential Leases Through Section 2-320 ofthe UCC, 50 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 482, 484, 489 (1973).
A contract of adhesion is defined as a form contract drafted by the party with the greater bar-
gaining power. The contract terms excessively benefit the stronger party, and it is offered to the
weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d at 331, 365
N.Y.S.2d at 687. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 271 (1960); Kessler, Con-
tracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom ofContract, 43 COLO. L. REv. 629, 630 (1943);
see also Standard Oil v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1965).
6. See notes 72-87 infra and accompanying text.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6 (1977); see notes 88-94 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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New York real property law8 and the Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act (URLTA)9 have codified the unconscionability doc-
trine's application to residential leases.
This Note first explores the need for a new approach to landlord-
tenant law, looking to prior legislative and judicial responses to prolan-
dlord clauses typically found in residential leases. Second, it examines
the courts' application of unconscionability to residential leases. Next,
it looks to the contract-law test of unconscionability and assesses the
courts' changes in the doctrine's application to landlord-tenant law. Fi-
nally, the Note analyzes the doctrine's potential for restoring a balance
between lessors and lessees in residential lease law.
I. THE NEED FOR NEW LEGAL APPROACHES
A. The Contract Setting Between Landlord and Tenant
At common law the lease was a conveyance of real property.'" Real
property law held that each party's obligations were independent; thus,
the tenant's obligation to pay, for example, was not affected by the
landlord's failure to provide a habitable residence." Courts' 2 and
commentators' 3 recently have begun to recognize that the lease is more
akin to a contract for necessary goods and services than to a convey-
ance of real property.
This shift to contract law provides several advantages to the lessee.
8. 49 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-c (McKinney Supp. 1978); see notes 95-99 infra and
accompanying text.
9. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, §§ 1.101, 1.303, 7A UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOTATED (Master ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as URLTA]; see notes 119-23 infra and
accompanying text.
10. See generally C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 63-86
(1962); C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 47-56 (1971).
11. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, at 70-7 1.
12. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'I Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Lemle
v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526
(1970); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. Ct. 1976), modfled, 93 Misc.
2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1978); 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties, 71 Misc. 2d 353,
335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. CtL 1973).
13. See, eg., Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease: Can Contract Law Provide the An-
swer:, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 204, 205-06 n.5 (1976); Line, Implied Warranties of Habitability and
Fitnessfor Intended Use in Urban ResidentialLeases, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 161 (1974); Moskovitz,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1444 (1974); Note, Covenant of Habitability and the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Legislation, 23 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 539 (1974).
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Obligations between the contracting parties require consideration1 4 and
must be viewed as mutually dependent.' The theory of dependent
covenants provides that failure by one party to perform as promised
constitutes a breach, relieving the other party of its duty to perform.' 6
Applied to landlord-tenant law, this theory gives the tenant leverage to
assert the rights granted in the lease and implied by law. Additionally,
many courts have read into residential leases an implied warranty of
habitability,' 7 which is similar to the implied warranty of
merchantability" or fitness for a particular purpose 19 recognized in
sales contracts.
Traditional contract law, however, because of its reliance on freedom
of contract, does not provide a full solution to the modem tenant's
problems. Freedom of contract implies that contracts are "the result of
the free bargaining of parties who are brought together by the play of
the market and who meet each other on a footing of social and approxi-
mate economic equality."2 In reality a shortage of adequate rental
housing in many areas21 limits the tenant's ability to choose acceptable
lease provisions.22 Because tenants cannot forego housing,23 landlords
possess the greater bargaining power.
Tenant freedom of contract is additionally limited by a second fac-
tor. Mass marketing techniques have given birth not only to standard
14. See generally IA A. CORBIN, supra note 5, at §§ 160-220.
15. See, e.g., Bayview Estates, Inc. v. Bayview Estates Mobile Homeowners Ass'n, 508 F.2d
405 (6th Cir. 1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973);
Berzito v. Gambino, 63 NJ. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Kipsborough Realty Corp. v. Goldbetter, 81
Misc. 2d 1054, 367 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
16. 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 5, at § 637.
17. See cases cited note 12 supra.
18. U.C.C. § 2-313.
19. U.C.C. § 2-314.
20. Kessler, supra note 5, at 630.
21. See, e.g., Avenue Assocs., Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 134, 371 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Civ. Ct.),
rev'don othergrounds, 83 Misc. 2d 719, 373 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Steinberg v. Carreras,
77 Misc. 2d 774, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties,
Inc., 329 A.2d 812 (1974); Indritz, supra note 5, at 4-7, 107-09 (noting especially a shortage of low-
income housing); Schoshinski, supra note 5, at 552 (shortage of low-income housing).
22. In the search for adequate housing, a tenant's freedom of choice is constrained by a
number of factors such as size, price, and location. The shortage of housing in a given area further
limits housing options. In light of these constraints the chance that a tenant will be able to choose
between lease options on several apartments is slight.
23. Unlike earlier times, the vast majority of tenants today are not capable of building their
own homes, nor do they have the means or skills required to repair their leased quarters.
Number 4]
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sales contracts,24 but also to standardized form leases. 25  Although
apartments may differ in location, size, appearance, and cost, landlords
tend to use the same form leases.26 Use of form leases by one landlord
reduces the lessee's ability to bargain with that landlord for favorable
terms; use of similar form leases by all landlords in an area reduces the
lessee's ability to go elsewhere to obtain favorable terms. Once uni-
formity of leases occurs, landlords are free to include in the form lease
a host of other terms and conditions that may excessively benefit them-
selves at the expense of tenants.' The full extent of this inequality
often escapes the tenant because the prolessor terms are often hidden in
pages of fine print containing clauses drafted in highly technical legal
language.2
8
B. Lease Terms Favoring Landlords
Most form leases contain a host of provisions that significantly affect
the obligations, rights, and remedies of the parties.29 A recitation of
24. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See gener-
ally Kessler, supra note 5.
25. See generally Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 809 (1974).
26. Indritz reports that in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, which includes Pittsburgh, more
than 90% of the realtors use a lease called "a catalogue of do's and don't's" developed by real
estate interests. Indritz, supra note 5, at 10. See generally Berger, supra note 25, at 791; Kirby,
supra note 13, at 204, 225.
27. See, e.g., Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 333, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 687 (Rockland
County Ct.), aj'd, 84 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Kirby, supra note 13, (quot-
ing Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 35, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136, 141-42 (Civ. Ct. 1973)).
In the ideal free-housing market, landlords would compete with each other not only on price
and appearance, but also on lease terms running with the apartments. Other factors being equal, a
landlord could attract tenants by offering more favorable lease terms than competitors offer. Uni-
form use of the same form not only assures landlords that they will not have to compete on lease
terms, but also allows use of increasingly greater prolandlord leases without loss of any competi-
tive advantage.
28. Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 332, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681, 687 (Rockland County
Ct.), aj'd, 84 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Berger, supra note 25, at 809, 821-
35.
A lease held to contain an unconscionable clause in Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc.
2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), af'd, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1973),
was 4 legal-size pages long, containing nearly 10,000 words in small, illegible print. If typed on
8 by 11 inch paper this lease would amount to approximately 50 pages of highly technical terms,
not usually understood by the residential lessee who most often signs a lease without the aid of a
lawyer.
Usually the tenant's primary concern is with the major lease terms such as price and appear-
ance; if these terms seem to be satisfactory, the tenant often does not attempt to understand the
full provisions of the lease document.
29. See generally Berger, supra note 25, at 821-35 (accumulating and analyzing representa-
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landlord remedies in the event of tenant breach or default 30 typically
constitutes a large percentage of the text of form leases. 31 Most leases
accord the landlord, upon the lessee's default, the right to reenter the
premises immediately 32 and to accelerate the balance of the rent due.
33
A lesser number of jurisdictions also permit the use of distress and dis-
traint for rent.34 Most leases allow the landlord to apply security de-
posits toward compensation for damage to the premises,35 but few
jurisdictions establish any deadline for refund of the remainder.36
Should the tenant quit the premises early, many jurisdictions allow the
landlord to recover the full amount due under the lease without any
requirement of an attempt to relet. 37  Leases commonly award the
tive standard-form apartment leases from 16 American cities). See also Commonwealth v. Monu-
mental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974).
Although each of these form-lease clauses will be treated separately, they often appear together
in a single form lease. Id.
30. Most leases define tenant default to encompass a wide range of actions. Landlord reme-
dies may be triggered not only by a failure to pay rent, but also by a failure to adhere to an
insubstantial regulation imposed by the landlord. This application of the definition frequently
renders a remedy onerous in application, though not unfair on its face.
31. Berger found that landlord remedies constituted from 21% to 47% of the provisions of
each lease he examined. Berger, supra note 25, at 828.
32. Possible methods for reentry include an action for summary judgment, peaceful reentry,
and forceful reentry (expelling a tenant without process). But see Pine Hill Assocs. v. Malveaux,
89 Misc. 2d 234, 391 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Yonkers City Ct. 1977) (forceable removal contrary to law and
public policy), rev'dandremanded, 93 Misc. 2d 63, 403 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1978). Frequently,
this type of lease provision gives the lessor the right to reenter either immediately or anytime
three-to-five days after default. Berger, supra note 25, at 828.
33. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974). Seegener-
ally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1, Comment k (1977).
34. This feudal remedy allows the lessor, in the event of default by the tenant, to enter the
tenant's premises without notice and to take possession of, levy upon, or even sell all chattel on the
premises to satisfy the tenant's debt. See generally Korngold, Can Distraint Stand Up as a Land-
lord's Remed? 5 REAL ESTATE L.J. 242 (1977).
35. Landlords can demand large security deposits and may often commingle these funds with
their personal funds without sanction. Berger, supra note 25, at 828.
36. Id. at 825. In addition, the tenant may have no primary and overriding claim to a partic-
ular sum that is set aside. In many jurisdictions tender of the deposit sets up a mere debtor-
creditor relationship. If the landlord fails to return the deposit, the tenant is in no better position
than a potentially large number of other unsecured creditors with whom the tenant must compete
for payment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1, Comment 1 (1977); Berger, supra
note 25, at 825. For the various state statutes relating to security deposits, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Note § 12.1(6) (1977).
37. See, e.g., Simons v. Federal Bar Bldg. Corp., 275 A.2d 545 (D.C. 1971); McIntosh v.
Gitomer, 120 A.2d 205 (D.C. 1956); Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ.
Ct.), modfled, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. CL 1976); Berger, supra note 25, at 829.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1(3) & Comment 1 (1977); Annot., 21
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landlord stipulated attorney fees for expenses of enforcement.
31
A tenant frequently assumes many obligations when signing a lease,
including indemnification of the landlord for any liability for damage
caused by the rental unit's condition or the landlord's negligence39 and
payment of certain cost increases of the landlord through such devices
as tax and labor escalation riders." Additionally, the tenant is required
to maintain the premises in good repair4' and to meet all present and
future rules and regulations.42
A.L.R.3d 534 (1968 & Supp. 1978). This type of provision is contrary to the traditional doctrine of
contract law.
The net effect is that although the premises might have been relet, resulting in little or no dam-
age to the landlord, the tenant may be liable to the lessor for the full amount due under the lease
despite the lessor's failure to make any reasonable attempt to relet the premises.
38. Berger, s'pra note 25, at 828. Some attorney fee provisions stipulate that the fee is due at
the commencement of an action for default, regardless of the outcome of the court action. See,
e.g., Simons v. Federal Bar Bldg. Corp., 275 A.2d 545 (D.C. 1971); McClelland-Metz, Inc. v.
Faulk, 86 Misc. 2d 778, 384 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Nassau County Ct. 1976); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81
Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Rockland County Ct.), a}7'd, 84 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276
(Sup. Ct. 1975). When the clause allows minimum attorney's fees at the commencement of the
action, which may be defined as mere notice to tenant, a landlord may collect attorney's fees from
the unwary tenant without ever really proceeding with the action. See note 81 infra and accompa-
nying text.
39. An example of an indemnity provision reads as follows:
Tenant agrees to protect, indemnify and save Lessor and its agents harmless from and
against any and all liabilities, damages and expenses arising from injury to persons or
property on the demised premises, or in and about the building in which said premises
are located, growing out of or connected with Tenant's use and occupancy of the de-
mised premises, or activities in or about the building in which said premises are located.
Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 135-36 n.l, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 n.l (1976).
For the current legal status of indemnification clauses in residential leases, see note 56 infra and
accompanying text.
40. Graff v. Transitube, 90 Misc. 2d 879, 396 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Civ. Ct. 1977); Graziano v.
Tortora Agency, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1094, 359 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Civ. Ct. 1974); Atkinson v. Trehan, 70
Misc. 2d 614, 334 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Civ. Ct. 1972). These riders may result in the landlord's recovery
of a sum that is greater than the total cost increase. A lease, for example, may stipulate a formula
to cover any tax escalation. As long as it uses an unambiguous formula, the lease may stipulate a
certain dollar amount for each one percent increase without any correlation between the total
amount and the actual increase.
41. "The lessee agrees . . . [to] at all times keep and maintain the leased premises and all
• . . equipment and fixtures therein or used therewith repaired. . . and in such good repair...
as the same are at the very beginning of. . . the term,. . . reasonable wear and tear and damage
by unavoidable casualty only excepted." Berger, supra note 25, at 832; see Jones v. Sheetz, 242
A.2d 208 (D.C. 1968).
42. A typical clause from a Cleveland lease reads:
Tenant shall observe the [Rules and Regulations]. Failure to keep and observe the said
rules will constitute a breach of the terms of lease in the same manner as if the said rules
were contained herein as covenants. . . . Tenant shall keep and observe such further
reasonable rules and regulations as may later be required by landlord. ...
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/4
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In exchange for these covenants, the tenant receives only limited
rights to the leased premises and the right to prior notice of lease
changes or termination; the tenant typically waives most other rights
and remedies.43 Through exculpation clauses tenants waive the right to
suit against the lessor for damage or injury,44 and through other provi-
sions lessees effectively waive the right to assert breach of the lessor's
implied warranty of habitability45 or to claim damages for late deliv-
ery.46 Confession-of-judgment clauses47-- clauses waiving any right to
Berger, supra note 25 at 833. "Such further reasonable rules and regulations" may include later
additions of such things as prohibitions against pets or piano playing after the tenant has moved in
with a cat or a piano. Id.
43. The lease is generally silent regarding both tenant rights and tenant remedies. "Where
language appears, however, an express waiver of remedy runs well ahead of an express confirma-
tion of remedy." Id, at 827.
44. A typical exculpatory clause provides:
Lessor and Lessor's agents and servants shall not be liable, and Tenant waives all claims,
for damage to person or property sustained by Tenant or any occupant of the building or
premises resulting from the building or any part of it or any equipment or appertenance
becoming out of repair, or resulting from any accident in or about the building, or result-
ing directly or indirectly from any act or neglect of any tenant or occupant of the build-
ing or of any other person.
Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 135 n.1, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 n.l (1976).
Exculpatory clauses frequently are coupled with indemnification clauses, discussed note 39
supra and accompanying text. For the current legal status of these clauses, see infra note 56 and
accompanying text.
45. Groner v. Lakeview Management Corp., 83 Misc. 2d 932, 373 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Civ. Ct.
1975); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Civ. Ct. 1973). These provisions
effectively shift the burden of repair that the law granted tenants through the implied warranty.
For the current status of such waivers, see note 59 infra and accompanying text.
46. Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), afl'd,
79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Hartwig v. 6465 Realty Co., 67 Misc. 2d 450,
324 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1971). This provision not only enables a landlord to protect himself
from liability, but also may require the tenant to accept the apartment when it does become avail-
able.
47. "This provision allows the landlord, through his attorney and without notice, to represent
the tenant ... for any alleged failure to pay rent, and to accept the judge's penalty without
argument or right of appeal." Note, supra note 5, at 482.
A typical lease provision found in a form prepared by the Chicago Real Estate Board reads as
follows:
Tenant. . . irrevocably authorizes any attorney of any court of record in any State of
the United States from time to time to appear for Tenant. . . in such court, to waive
process, service, and trial by jury, to confess judgment in favor of Owner... and
against Tenant ... for any rent due hereunder from Tenant to Owner and for Owner's
costs and reasonably attorney's fees, to waive and release all errors in such proceedings
and all right of appeal and to consent to an immediate execution upon the judgment.
Id. at 482 n.5.
For the present legal status of confession-of-judgment clauses, see note 58 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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set-off,48 counterclaim, 49 or representation in landlord suits-and other
clauses containing such waivers as the statutorily required thirty-days
notice to quit5" and the right to jury trial,51 all eliminate rights often
accorded a defaulting party. As a catchall, landlords often add provi-
sions through which the tenant generally and unconditionally waives
all unexplained rights, including statutory rights.52
C. Judicial and Legislative Treatment of Prolandlord Clauses
Lease clauses may gain strength by their mere presence in the signed
document, because many tenant arguments about unfair clauses never
reach the courtroom. The dollar amounts at issue are usually small in
comparison to the time and transaction costs of litigation. The land-
lord may discourage the tenant's raising potentially successful argu-
ments by merely pointing to a printed clause purporting to control the
issue; the lessee, ignorant of the law, has no reason to know that courts
might not enforce the designated provision. To aid residential tenants
48. One such clause in a Chicago form lease reads:
Owner's breach of the covenants set forth in this paragraph . . . shall not affect the
obligation of Tenant to pay rent, and Tenant's sole remedy therefor shall be recovery of
damages from Owner (it being expressly agreed that. . . Tenant's damages for any such
breach may not be set off for the purpose of determining whether any rent is due in a
forcible detainer action. . . brought on the basis of unpaid rent).
Berger, supra note 25, at 827.
49. See Edgemont Assoc. v. Skolnick, 90 Misc. 2d 761, 396 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Justice Ct. 1977);
Amazon Management Corp. v. Paff, 166 Misc. 438, 1 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. 1938). A tenant
asserting an implied warranty of habitability argument can force the court to hear affirmative
defenses in a summary proceeding. Bianchi v. Savage, 83 Misc. 2d 1007, 373 N.Y.S.2d 976 (White
Plains City Ct. 1975); Sf Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 815 (Pa.
1974) (Pennsylvania Consumer Protection law held inapplicable to rental of residential housing).
50. See Diamond Hous. Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969); Jones v. Sheetz, 242
A.2d 208 (D.C. 1968).
51. See, eg., Koslowski v. Palmieri, 94 Misc. 2d 555, 404 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Civ. Ct. 1978), rev'd,
414 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (per curiam); Avenue Assocs., Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 134,
371 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Civ. Ct.), rev'don other grounds, 83 Misc. 2d 719, 373 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct.
1975); Berger, supra note 25, at 829. It must be remembered that a confession-of-judgment clause,
discussed notes 47, 58 supra, 125 infra and accompanying text, limits the tenant's rights even more
fully than a waiver of right to a jury trial and, in fact, even disallows tenant self-representation in
court.
52. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 814 (Pa. 1974). This pro-
vision was contained in a form lease used by an overwhelming majority of lessors in the Pitts-
burgh area, see note 26 supra and accompanying text. The court did not explain the possible
implications of the waiver, but on its face it would appear to disallow any and all rights implied by
law or granted by statute unless specifically enumerated in the lease. Utter silence is the usual
pattern of tenant rights and remedies. See note 43 supra.
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effectively, therefore, the landlord must be discouraged from over-
reaching in the lease agreement itself.
The traditional approach in residential lease cases applies three well-
settled rules of interpretation: the plain meaning rule,5 3 the parol evi-
dence rule,5 4 and the principle holding parties bound by their signa-
tures.5 As a result of this strict approach, prolandlord provisions are
usually enforced.
Some courts and legislatures, however, ignore the traditional ap-
proach and construe leases to the tenant's advantage. In some in-
stances courts have directly prohibited or limited certain prolandlord
lease terms. This approach, however, has been limited to exculpation
and indemnification provisions, 6 distress and distraint authoriza-
53. If the court finds as a matter of law that the contract is unambiguous, evidence of the
intention and acts of the parties plays no part in the decision of the case.... The
conduct of the parties may fix a meaning to words of doubtful import. It may not change
the terms of a contract.
Graff v. Transitube, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 879, 881, 396 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (Civ. Ct. 1977); see, e.g.,
Heller & Henretig, Inc. v. 3620-168th St., Inc., 302 N.Y. 326, 330, 98 N.E.2d 458, 459 (1951); Luna
Park Hous. Corp. v. Besser, 38 A.D.2d 713, 714, 329 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (1972) (mem.). See gener-
ally Berger, supra note 25, at 793.
54. The parol evidence rule provides that the written lease embodies the total agreement
between the parties; evidence of any contrary agreements or understandings is inadmissable. See
Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 463, 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1971). See generally 4
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 631-632A (3d ed. 1961).
55. This principle disallows any defense that the tenant failed to read or understand the
lease. McIntosh v. Gitomer, 120 A.2d 205 (D.C. 1955); Carbone v. Sparkes, 350 Ill. App. 56, 111
N.E.2d 567 (1953); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 472, 276 N.E.2d 144, 152 (1971)
(Prentice, J., dissenting); Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apartments Section 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d
1097, 359 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Civ. Ct. 1974). See generally 1 WILLISTON, supra note 54, at §§ 631-
632A.
56. See notes 39, 44 supra and accompanying text. Historically, most jurisdictions, in the
name of preserving freedom of contract, upheld exculpation and indemnification clauses. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 574 (1933). "A bargain for exemption from liability for the con-
sequences of negligence not falling greatly below the standard established by law for the protec-
tion of others against unreasonable risk of harm, is legal except in the cases stated in § 575."
Id. Section 575 forbids exemptions for negligent injury to employees in the course of the employ-
ment relationship and in certain instances when a party is charged with a duty of public service.
Id. § 575.
A trend of voiding or prohibiting these clauses is emerging. See, e.g., Henrioulle v. Marin
Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1978); Weaver v. American Oil
Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind.
App. 1976); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941); Cardona v. Eden Realty Co.,
118 N.J. Super. 381, 288 A.2d 34 (App. Div. 1972); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super.
575, 111 A.2d 445 (App. Div. 1955); Billie Knitwear, Inc. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 174 Misc.
978, 22 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1940), ag d, 288 N.Y. 682, 43 N.E.2d 80 (1942). At least 21 states
now have passed statutes prohibiting exculpation or indemnity of liability in residential leases.
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tions,5 7 confession-of-judgment clauses,58 and waivers of the implied
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Note § 17.3 (1977) (listing of statutes en-
acted as of June 1, 1976). Section 1.403 of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
specifically prohibits inclusion of these clauses.
This trend is based on the argument that the clauses offend public policy. In Rossman the
Minnesota Supreme Court made enforceability depend on a balancing test:
The enforceability of a lease clause which exculpates a landlord from liability for negli-
gence is a question of balance. The public policy favoring freedom of contract is
weighed against the policy favoring the landlord's observance of the particular duty he is
alleged to have breached. Thus, the balance depends on the nature of the particular duty
breached. If the landlord's duty is basic and his observance of it is of extreme impor-
tance (for example, a duty to maintain the stairs of a common area in safe condition so as
to avoid personal injury to tenants), then the policy favoring his observance of that duty
may well be stronger than the policy favoring freedom of contract. On the other hand, if
the duty the landlord breaches is less basic and his observance of it is not of such grave
importance (for example, a duty, if such exists, to maintain the temperature of the prem-
ises at such levels as will not injure a tenant's tropical houseplants), then freedom of
contract may well be the dominant policy. If the freedom of contract is the dominant
policy, then an exculpatory clause may be enforced.
Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 136-37, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 (1976).
57. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
Many state statutes specifically prohibit use of distress and distraint, particularly in residential
leases. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.250 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1372 (1974); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6301 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.691 (West Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 504.01 (West 1947). See also Price v. Hoyle, 82 Misc. 2d 174,368 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Rockland
County Ct. 1975). URLTA abolishes distress for rent as well. URLTA, supra note 9, at § 4.205.
See generall, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Note § 12.1 (1977).
Many courts have held distress and distraint unconstitutional under the due process clause. See,
e.g., Stroemer v. Shevin, 399 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152
(W.D. Pa. 1975); Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. Paul L'Esperance, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1265 (D.C. Pa.
1975); Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va. 1972); Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp.
823 (D. Neb. 1972); Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 336 F.
Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Van Ness
Indus., Inc. v. Claremont Painting & Decorating Co., 129 N.J. Super. 507, 324 A.2d 102 (Ch. Div.
1974); Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 731 (rex. Civ. App. 1975).
The reasoning basically follows that of the United States Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), which declared a Wisconsin garnishment statute unconstitutional.
The hardship involved and the lack of prior notice and hearing provided the basis for the decision.
This approach, however, is not universal. See William v. Stancil, 168 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. App.
1969) (distraint statute must be strictly construed). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY, Statutory Note § 12.1 (1977). A Pennsylvania statute still authorizes the remedy:
Personal property located upon premises occupied by a tenant shall, unless exempted
by article four of this act, be subject to distress for any rent reserved and due. Such
distress may be made by the landlord or his agent duly authorized thereto in writing.
Such distress may be made on any day, except Sunday, between the hours of seven ante
meridian and seven post meridian and not at any other time, except where the tenant
through his act prevents the execution of the warrant during such hours.
Notice in writing of such distress, stating the cause of such taking specifying the date
of levy and the personal property distrained sufficiently to inform the tenant or owner
what personal property is distrained and the amount of rent in arrears, shall be given,
within five days after making the distress, to the tenant and any other owner known to
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warranty of habitability.59
the landlord, personally, or by mailing the same to the tenant or any other owner at the
premises, or by posting the same conspicuously on the premises charged with the rent.
A landlord or such agent may also, in the manner provided, distrain personal property
located on the premises but only that belonging to the tenant, for arrears of rent due on
any lease which has ended and terminated, if such distress is made during the continu-
ance of the landlord's title or interest in the property.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.302 (Purdon 1965).
Section 250.309 further provides that if the tenant fails to replevy the property within the speci-
fied five day period, the property can be appraised and sold at public auction six days later by the
sheriff to pay the landlord monies owed to him. Id. § 250.309.
A typical clause authorizing a sheriffs sale reads in pertinent part:
In the event of any default. . . the Lessor, or anyone acting on Lessor's behalf, at
Lessor's option: (a) may without notice or demand enter the demised premises, breaking
open locked doors if necessary to effect entrance, without liability to action for prosecu-
tion or damages for such entry or for the manner thereof, for the purpose of distraining
or levying and.for any otherpurpose, and take possession of and sell all goods and chat-
tels at auction ....
48 TEMP. L.Q. 820, 829 (1975) (emphasis added). Court decisions on the constitutionality of this
provision conflict. Compare Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (declaring the
statute facially unconstitutional as a violation of fourteenth amendment due process), vacated, 496
F.2d 1153 (3rd Cir. 1974) (vacated on procedural grounds as moot), with Commonwealth v. Mon-
umental Properties, Inc., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 596, 611-12, 314 A.2d 333, 340 (1973) ("As we read
these Federal cases [declaring the right to distraint unconstitutional], however, we do not discern
any firm holding that all clauses of distraint are unconstitutional."), modoied, 329 A.2d 812 (Pa.
1974). The scope of the holdings in these cases also conflict, see Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp.
528 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding limited to sales
of property only); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (finding of unconstitu-
tionality limited to sales and to indigent tenants), and emerge only from the lower courts, see
Korngold, supra note 34, at 244.
58. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. A few states authorize the use of confession-
of-judgment clauses. ILL. RE. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (Supp. 1976) (general confession-of-judgment
statute not limited to landlord-tenant); Mo. REV. STAT. § 511.100 (1978) (same); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2323.12, .13 (Page 1954 & Supp. 1978) (same). Most states, however, prohibit the clauses.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-9- 11 (1977) (agreements declared void); ARIZ. RE. STAT. ANN. § 6-629
(1956) (prohibited in small loans); id. § 44-143 (on all instruments authority must be acknowl-
edged and executed subsequent to date confessed indebtedness due); IND. CODE § 34-2-25-1
(1976) (confession under power of attorney illegal on any contract action); id. § 34-2-28-1 (pro-
curer of cognovit guilty of misdemeanor and subject to fine and imprisonment); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 13A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974) (confession of judgment declared void for all
instruments); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-16 (1978) (agreements on any written contract to pay
money executed before cause of action accrues declared unlawful and void); id. § 39-1-18 (pro-
curer of cognovit guilty of misdemeanor and subject to fine and imprisonment). See also Note, A
Clash in Ohio? Cognovit Notes and The Business Ethic ofthe UCC, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 470,490-91
(1966). Some states that do not prohibit the clauses severely limit their use. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 342-88, 36-236 (1979) (confession ofjudgment in retail installment contract or installment
loan contract invalid and unenforceable); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 493.12 (1948) (confession ofjudg-
ment in small loans prohibited); id. § 600.2906 (requires special instrument) (1948); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 548.22 (1945) (confession ofjudgment authorized for money due or to secure against con-
tingent liability); id. § 541.09 (1945) (one year statute of limitations after cause of action arises;
one year statute of limitation on actions on judgments by confession); id. § 168.71 (Supp. 1980)
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To aid tenants courts also use covert judicial tools6 0 to eviscerate the
effect of other onerous clauses. For example, the court may find that
the landlord, by some action after signing the lease, effectively waived
his right to enforce a written provision, even if that waiver was not
knowledgeable.61 Courts may also invoke the contract rule that any
(invalid and unenforceable in retail installment sales contracts); id. § 56.12 (Supp. 1980) (use pro-
hibited by small loan licensees) (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:16-9 (1952) (separate instrument
required); id. § 17.16c-37 (Supp. 1979) (confession of judgment prohibited in retail installment
sales contract and retail charge accounts).
Although the Supreme Court has held that confession-of-judgment provisions are not per se
unconstitutional, see D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox,
405 U.S. 191, 200, rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 1049 (1972), the Court suggested a standard of con-
stitutionality requiring that waivers be "voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made." D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. at 185.
The Overmyer Court avoided a determination that the Constitution mandated the standard
because the facts supported a conclusion that the test was met. Id. at 187. The party subject to the
clause, a corporation, was represented by counsel in negotiations, and did not have lesser bargain-
ing power. Id. at 186. The clause, therefore, could not be the type contained in a contract of
adhesion. Further, the party received valuable consideration for the waiver. Id. at 183. The
Court specifically stated, however, "Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other
facts of other cases. For example, where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great
disparity of bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision,
other legal consequences may ensue." Id. at 188. This statement indicates that confession-of-
judgment clauses in the majority of residential leases will not be enforceable. That result, how-
ever, will turn on the courts' interpretation of the word "voluntary" and whether voluntariness is
necessarily negated in contracts of adhesion.
In Swarb, the companion case, the Court affirmed in part a district court opinion that held
confession-of-judgment clauses unconstitutional as applied to persons with incomes of less than
$10,000 per year, unless the clauses meet the Overmyer test. Plaintiffs stipulated that they were
either unaware of the clause, unable to understand its meaning, or unable to bargain for different
terms in any case. 405 U.S. at 197. They also introduced evidence from a study almost exclusively
of persons with incomes of less than $10,000, a majority of whom lacked high-school degrees. The
Supreme Court did not specifically rule on the district court's holding that the clause was uncon-
stitutional as applied to the facts of the case, as that issue was not before the Court, but refused to
find the provision unconstitutional on its face or to extend the holding to apply to those persons
with incomes of greater than $10,000.
59. See notes 17, 45 supra and accompanying texts. Most statutes and court decisions recog-
nizing the existence of an implied warranty of habitability have prohibited or limited use of waiv-
ers of the warranty in residential leases. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184,
293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Houston Realty Corp. v. Castro, 94 Misc. 2d 115, 404 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Civ.
Ct. 1978); Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 1978). But see Kamarath v. Bennett, 568
S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Note to ch. 5
(1976).
60. Seegeneraly Berger, supra note 25, at 794-813 (analyzing a majority of the reported New
York landlord and tenant decisions from 1970 to 1972).
61. Seventy-Second St. Properties, Inc. v. Woods, 67 Misc. 2d 539, 324 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Civ. Ct.
1971). This theory for finding waiver has been especially useful in the past and remains effective
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ambiguity is construed against the drafter62 to yield a protenant result,
even if no ambiguity is present in the lease.6" Although the form lease
normally defines breach as failure to fulfill any covenant and thus does
not distinguish between substantial and insubstantial tenant obliga-
tions, 64 courts may refuse to grant the landlord recourse for an insub-
stantial breach.6 5 Courts may also use the "rule of reason" to read into
the lease the court's concept of the intent of the parties, and in the proc-
ess, obviate the clear language of the lease.66 Finally, courts may refuse
to enforce a landlord's unconscionable conduct.67
In the broad perspective, however, covert interpretative tools do not
to a limited extent in the area of assignment; consent to one assignment waives the landlord's right
to refuse consent to later assignments. Moss v. Chappell, 126 Ga. 196, 54 S.E. 968 (1906); Olivero
v. Duran, 70 Misc. 2d 882, 334 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Civ. Ct. 1972); Dumpor v. Symms, 76 Eng. Rep.
1110 (K.B. 1603).
62. See, eg., Union Bank v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 528 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1975); Taft Broad-
casting Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1971); John W. Johnson, Inc. v. Basic Constr. Co.,
429 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Float-Away Door Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 372 F.2d 701 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 825 (1967).
63. See note 60 supra. To limit the landlord's recovery to no more than unavoidable conse-
quences of the tenant's abandonment of the premises before the lease's expiration, courts have
held that the landlord who reenters must attempt to relet the premises to recover damages. See,
e.g. Manley v. Kellar, 47 Del. 511, 94 A.2d 219 (1956); Kanter v. Safran, 99 So. 2d 706 (Fla.
1958); cases listed in Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 556 (1968). Some courts, however, have construed
reentry clauses, which provide that the landlord may reenter, to mean that the landlord must
reenter. A similar interpretation would also require the landlord to attempt to relet the premises.
See Crow v. Kaupp, 50 S.W.2d 995 (Mo. 1932); cases listed in 21 A.L.R.3d 534, 540 (1968).
In another case, Bettinelli v. Peterson Kane, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 444, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (App.
Div. 1969) (per curiam), a fire clause permitted termination by the landlord if the premises were
rendered wholly untenantable or if the building was so damaged that the landlord decided to
rebuild it. The court construed the clause to require both circumstances when the tenant's apart-
ment was only partially damaged, so that landlord could not terminate for inconsequential fire
damage.
64. See note 30 supra.
65. Berger, supra note 25, at 800; see Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 136-37, 241
N.W.2d 91, 92 (1976).
66. See Pine Hill Assocs. v. Malveaux, 93 Misc. 2d 63, 403 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. Div. 1978),
rev'g 89 Misc. 2d 234, 391 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Yonkers City Ct. 1977); Seabrook v. Commuter Hous.
Co., 79 Misc. 2d 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Div. 1973), af'g 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67
(Civ. Ct. 1972); Hartwig v. 6465 Realty Co., 67 Misc. 2d 450, 324 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 1971);
SKD Enterprises, Inc. v. L & M Offset, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 612, 318 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Civ. Ct. 1971);
Berger, supra note 25, at 804.
67. This use of unconscionability looks not to an unconscionable provision in the lease, but
to the unconscionable acts of the landlord. Berger, supra note 25, at 806; see 57 E. 54 Realty
Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. Div. 1972); SKD
Enterprises, Inc. v. L & M Offset, Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 612, 318 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Civ. Ct. 1971); cf. Tai
on Luck Corp. v. Ciorta, 35 A.D.2d 380, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1970) (increasing rent from $400 to
$2000 per month is unconscionable).
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adequately balance the rights, remedies, and obligations imposed by
the lease. This ad-hoc method of interpretation fails to set standards
for future cases and, as a result, may be unfair to both landlord and
tenant by failing to provide adequate or consistent notice of the effect
of written provisions. Further, by striking the particular use of a provi-
sion and not its principle, courts merely encourage landlords to redraft
the same clauses in more definite language. "The net effect is unneces-
sary confusion and unpredictability, together with inadequate remedy,
and evil persisting that calls for remedy. 6 8
Another judicial approach requires that certain types of tenant waiv-
ers must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.69 Some
courts implementing this standard impose on the landlord an affirma-
tive duty to make the particular clause or clauses known to the tenant.
This approach may remedy the tenant's difficulties in reading and un-
derstanding the lease, but it does not deal with the tenant's most diffi-
cult problems-the lack of meaningful choice caused by the housing
shortage, and the relative lack of bargaining power. A lease that
clearly identifies for the tenant the prolandlord rights, obligations, and
remedies may merely point out the relative lack of power; it does not
restore freedom of contract.7' These approaches thus fall far short of
68. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 702-03 (1939).
69. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972); Weaver v. American Oil
Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1971); note 58 supra.
70. Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Weaver v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 464, 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1971); Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72
Misc. 2d 6, 11, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 73 (Civ. Ct. 1972) (landlord was "also under an affirmative duty
to bring clauses 19 and 33 to the attention of the lessee and to explain their meaning before asking
lessee to execute the lease."), aj'd, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Div. 1973). Contra,
Diamond Hous. Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492, 494 (D.C. 1969); Cailler v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., 117 N.H. 915, 919, 379 A.2d 1253, 1256 (1977). The underlying justification for this
approach appears to be concern with the technical and complex form of the lease document itself;
unfair surprise is avoided when the landlord must point out and explain the consequences of a
given clause.
71. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, An Attack on Confes-
sion ofJudgment Clauses in Residential Leases Through Section 2-302 of the UCC, 50 CHi.-KENT
L. REv. 482, 495 (1973).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently adopted an approach that, because it does not ex-
tend much beyond the "affirmative duty" approach, is subject to the same criticisms. In Common-
wealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974), the State Attorney General
brought suit against 25 major representative landlords and four lease form printers, alleging three
counts. First, the Attorney General charged that defendants used leases that employed "archaic
and technical language beyond the easy comprehension of the consumer of average intelligence,"
Id. at 814. Second, the Attorney General claimed that the leases contained "illegal, unconsciona-
ble and unconstitutional and hence, unenforceable" provisions, including lessor's right to dis-
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remedying tenant problems.
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY IN LANDLORD-TENANT LAW:
ITS SOURCES AND APLICATIONS
Although unconscionability has long been a part of contract law,7 2
traint, confession of judgment, unlimited discretion to accelerate rent, waiver of claim for lessor's
negligence, waiver of all unexplained rights, waiver of demand, notice, and right of appeal, and
waiver of standing to open or strike judgments. Id. Third, the Attorney General asserted that the
failure to include in the leases notice of statutory rights, some of which are nonwaivable by law,
was misleading and confusing. Id. The court refused to find these clauses unconscionable, id. at
828, but held that the state's consumer protection law, Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act
and Consumer Protection Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-I to 201-9 (1971), was applicable to
unfair and deceptive practices involving residential leases.
[T]he Consumer Protection Law was designed to equalize the market position and
strength of the consumer vis-a-vis the seller. A perception of unfairness led the Legisla-
ture to regulate more closely market transactions. The mischief to be remedied was the
use of unfair or deceptive acts and practices by sellers. As part of the Law's object,
fraudulent conduct that would mislead or confuse a consumer was banned.
Functionally viewed, the modem apartment dweller is a consumer of housing services.
The contemporary leasing of residences envisions one person (landlord) exchanging for
periodic payments of money (rent) a bundle of goods and services, rights and obliga-
tions.
329 A.2d at 820. The court also remanded the case for a determination of whether the leases'
silence on tenants statutory rights, some of which were nonwaivable, was misleading under the
consumer protection law. Use of this statute opens the way for requiring landlords to use clearer
language and, perhaps, to inform tenants of their nonwaivable statutory rights; however, it does
not relieve the problems caused by the tenant's lack of meaningful choice.
72. See Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750), quoted in Hume v.
United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889). The first codification of unconscionability appeared in
the UCC. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev.
485, 489-501, 509-16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as The Emperor's New Clause]. Currently, the Code
provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302. The stated purpose of this provision is to avoid the use of covert tools to police
lease provisions. The draftsmen's commentary to this section reads:
This section was intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against
the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing
has been accompanied by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules
of offer and acceptance or by determination that the clause is contrary to public policy or
to the dominant purpose of the contract.
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its application to residential leases is relatively recent.73 It may be ap-
plied to leases as an equitable doctrine, an extension of the Uniform
Commercial Code, an application of the principles in the Restatement
(Second) of Property, or under New York real property law and the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.
A. Equitable Unconscionabili&y
The doctrine of unconscionability originated in courts of equity 4
Equitable unconscionability is defined as that which "no man in his
right senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand and
...no honest and fair man would accept on the other."7  It encom-
passes those dealings that shock the conscience of the court. 6 Weaver
v. American Oil Co., 7 one of the early cases7 8 to use the doctrine to
Id Comment 1 (1962 version). See also Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Con-
trol of/Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529, 563 (1971).
For a general discussion of U.C.C. § 2-302 unconscionability, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 112-13 (1972); Ellinghaus, In
Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-
Consumers and The Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PiTr. L. REV. 349 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
The Common Law Tradition]; Murray, Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); Spanogle,
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931 (1969); Speidel, Unconsclonability,
Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970).
73. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 247 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971). Unconscionability
was used at least ten years ago in an equity suit over a lease. See Diamond Hous. Corp. v.
Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969); Jones v. Sheetz, 242 A.2d 208 (D.C. 1968).
74. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); cases listed in U.C.C. § 2-
302, Comment 1 (1962 version); note 73 supra.
75. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750), quoted in Hume v. United
States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889).
76. See Stiefler v. McCullough, 97 Ind. App. 123, 130, 174 N.E. 823, 826 (1931); Wasserbauer
v. Marine Midland Bank-Rochester, 92 Misc. 2d 388, 400, 400 N.Y.S.2d 979, 987 (Monroe County
Ct. 1977). The Georgia courts define an unconscionable contract as "one [that is] abhorrent to
good morals and conscience. It is one where one of the parties takes a fraudulent advantage of
another.... Unconscionability is directly related to fraud and deceit, which in turn may be
found where there is great inadequacy of consideration or great disparity of mental ability." F.N.
Roberts Pest Control Co. v. McDonald, 132 Ga. App. 257, 260, 208 S.E.2d 13, 15 (1974) (emphasis
in original).
77. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1972). The exculpation and indemnity clause was similar
to the standard form discussed in notes 39, 44, 56 supra.
Although this case involved a commercial lease between a service station operator and the oil
company owner, it is analogous to the situation of the residential lease to the extent that the court
found the lessee "was not one who should be exptected to know the law or understand the mean-
ing of technical terms." 257 Ind. at 460, 276 N.E.2d at 145-46. The operator had only a year-and-
a-half of high school, and had held various semiskilled and unskilled labor jobs. Although the
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void a lease provision, refused to enforce an exculpation and indemnifi-
cation clause when the lessor's agent negligently injured the lessee.
Other courts79 have refused to enforce disclaimers of liability for the
curtailment or interruption of services"0 and provisions requiring the
contractual relationship had been renewed for several years, giving lessee more than ample time to
read the lease or to have it explained to him by someone else, the court found that "the signifi-
cance of Weaver's signature upon the legal document amounted to nothing more than a mere
formality to Weaver for the substantial protection of American Oil." Id. at 461, 276 N.E.2d at
146. In addition, the lease was a form contract written in fine print. The lessor had superior
bargaining power and submitted the lease on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, as is typical with modem
form contracts. Id. at 462, 276 N.E.2d at 147. The court also found that the lease terms taken as a
whole were unfair to the extent that in exchange for accepting this liability burden, lessee was
bound to operate the service station for long hours, seven days a week, for less than $6000 per
year. Id. The court indicated that if the UCC were applicable, the lease would be unconscionable
under § 2-302. Id. at 461, 276 N.E.2d at 146.
This case is most often cited for the proposition that exculpation clauses are against public
policy or that the party submitting a package that contains such clauses has an affirmative duty to
make the unusual or unconscionable terms known to the lessee. See notes 69-71 supra and ac-
companying text. It clearly states a case for equitable unconscionability. The court cites the fol-
lowing as a definition of equitable unconscionability: "where one party has taken advantage of
another's necessities and distress to obtain an unfair advantage over him, the latter, owing to his
condition, has encumbered himself with a heavy liability or an onerous obligation for the sake of a
small or inadequate present gain, there will be relief granted." 257 Ind. at 462, 276 N.E.2d at 146
(quoting Stiefler v. McCullough, 97 Ind. App. 123, 130-31, 174 N.E. 823, 826 (1931)). It is difficult
to say how far the court would extend this principle. "Relief" may consist merely of assuring that
the party with lesser bargaining power had knowledge of the terms, especially in the case in which
the lessee might have had other options. If so, then the court holds only that knowledge alleviates
the unfairness. The court's rationale should extend to the landlord-tenant situation in which the
lessee has no other options, despite knowledge of the term.
78. Two older District of Columbia cases refused to find unconscionable waivers of 30-day
notice-to-quit provisions. Diamond Hous. Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969); Jones v.
Sheetz, 242 A.2d 208 (D.C. 1968). Both courts noted the absence of extreme one-sidedness when
use of the clause was conditioned upon the tenant's failure to comply with the terms of the lease.
The Diamond court also noted that such clauses were routinely used.
79. Most case law using unconscionability comes from the New York courts. One explana-
tion for this fact is that New York has more renters, harsher leases, or a more severe housing
shortage. In light of New York's adoption of Real Property Law § 235-c, a more accurate expla-
nation might be that the New York courts are more predisposed toward use of the doctrine. See
notes 95-97 infra and accompanying text. Another possible explanation is that New York is one of
the few states that reports trial court decisions. Because most residential landlord-tenant cases
involve small amounts, it is not likely that either party will appeal an adverse judgment. See
Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 204, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 964 (Civ. Ct. 1976), modfied, 93 Misc.
2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
80. In Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apartments, Section 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1097, 359
N.Y.S.2d 387 (1974), tenants were allowed to recover the cost of renting air conditioning units
during the 16-week period their central air was not in service, despite a disclaimer in the lease.
The court emphasized the adhesive nature of the lease and the limited housing market, which
offered tenants no meaningful choice among housing or lease provisions. Id. at 1099, 359
N.Y.S.2d at 390. The court also noted that the lease impliedly recognized the necessity of air
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tenant to pay attorney's fees upon the commencement of proceedings
by the landlord.81
B. Extensions of the Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) authorizes
courts to refuse enforcement of unconscionable contracts for the sale of
goods.82 Some commentators have urged extension, by analogy, of this
provision to residential leases.8 3  This approach comports with the
trend toward viewing leases as equivalent to contracts for the sale of
goods.84 Use of this rationale has been limited, however, perhaps be-
cause some states have adopted statutes explicitly applying unconscion-
ability to leases.8 5
conditioning as demonstrated by its listing of air conditioning alongside of such services as heat,
water, and refrigeration. Id. at 1098, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 389. "Where clauses in form leases of this
type are unreasonably weighted in favor of the landlord, they may be subject to the defense of
unconscionability, and denied enforcement." Id. at 1099, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
The court in Groner v. Lakeview Management Corp., 83 Misc. 2d 932, 373 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Civ.
Ct. 1975), held the language of a similar clause to be "a classic example of unconscionability." Id.
at 934, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 809. Unlike the Harwood court, however, the Groner court provided little
reasoning for its holding of unconscionability-indicating that such clauses might be per se un-
conscionable in residential leases. The doctrine, however, proved to be of little aid to the tenant in
this case, as the court allowed recovery of only six cents, because of a lack of proof on damages.
But see Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Civ. Ct. 1973), in which the court
found it had responsibility to make the determination, without expert testimony, of injury suffered
from the heat being shut off. "A basic rule of damage, particularly appropriate in this kind of
situation is that where damage has in fact been unjustifiably sustained, all relief should not be
denied because it is not possible to fix with certainty the precise value of the damage." Id. at 38,
344 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
The Steinberg case also involved a disclaimer in the event of a failure to provide continuous
heat. In a summary nonpayment proceeding that followed a concerted withholding of rent by 36
tenants to force restoration of an appropriate level of services, the court awarded the tenants
damages for certain days. The court determined that it could provide a just outcome through a
reasonable interpretation of the language of the lease, but noted that the pervasive character of
form leases and the inability of tenants to negotiate for other terms "callfs] for the unhesitating
application of the doctrine of unconscionability when their terms bring about clearly unjust conse-
quences." Id. at 36, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
81. McClelland-Metz Management, Inc. v. Faulk, 86 Misc. 2d 778, 384 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup.
Ct. 1976); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Rockland County Ct.), q/J'd,
84 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (App. Term 1975) (affirmed on the unconscionability issue).
82. See note 72 supra.
83. See, e.g., Bolgar, The Contract of./dhesion: .4 Comparison of Theory andPractice, 20 Am.
J. CoMP. L. 53, 70 (1972); Cramer, Extension of the Uniform Commercial Code's Unconscionable
Contract Provision to Exculpatory Lease Clauses, 5 AM. Bus. L.J. 271, 291-92 (1967); Ellinghaus,
supra note 72, at 808-12; Comment, supra note 71.
84. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 95-97, 119-23 infra and accompanying text.
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Seabrook P. Commuter Housing Co. 6 exemplifies this approach. The
lease in Seabrook contained a clause providing that if the apartment
building were not completed by a specified date, the lease obligations
would begin upon completion. When the building remained unfin-
ished three months after the specified date of completion, the tenant
sought a release from the lease obligations and a refund of money al-
ready paid. The court looked to the complexity and length of the lease
document, the landlord's greater expertise in lease transactions, the
scarcity of apartments, and the adhesive nature of form leases in gen-
eral, to hold the lease unconscionable because it resembled "a business
pattern closely akin to what the drafters of section 2-302 sought to pro-
hibit. . .[which] may be related to the Code by analogy."87
C. The Restatement (Second) of Property
The Restatement (Second) of Property includes a provision allowing
parties freedom to contract for obligations and remedies so long as the
agreements are neither unconscionable nor against public policy.s8
The commentary to this section suggests guidelines for its application,8 9
and notes the following factors as influential in determining the exist-
86. 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), aft'd, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566
(Sup. Ct. 1973). See also Tai on Luck Corp. v. Cirota, 35 A.D.2d 380, 387, 316 N.Y.S.2d 438, 444
(1970).
87. 72 Misc. 2d at 9, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6 (1977) provides:
The parties to a lease may agree to increase or decrease what would otherwise be the
obligations of the landlord with respect to the condition of the leased property and may
agree to expand or contract what would otherwise be the remedies available to the tenant
for the breach of those obligations, and those agreements are valid and binding on the
parties to the lease unless they are unenforceable in whole or in part because they are
unconscionable or significantly against public policy.
89. Id.,Comment e. The guideline factors, presumably not exclusive, that may be used to
determine if the lease is unenforceable in whole or in part include:
(1) Whether and to what extent the agreement will be counter to the policy underly-
ing statutory or regulatory provisions, especially those relating to the public health and
safety and those relating to the tenants of moderate income in multi-unit residential or
office properties;
(2) Whether the agreement or provision appears in a lease of commercial or indus-
trial property or of an entire building or a large portion of a building, or of a substantial
residence or estate designed for single family occupancy, properties concerning which
freedom of negotiation is usually permissible;
(3) Whether and to what extent the agreement or provision serves a reasonable busi-
ness purpose and appears to have been the result of conscious negotiations for the distri-
bution of risks as part of the total bargain contained in the lease;
(4) Whether the provision appears to be part of an unduly harsh and unreasonable
standard, "boilerplate" lease document;
(5) Whether and to what extent the parties or either of them, habitually (or on a
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ence of unconscionability: the commercial or residential nature of the
lease;90 the presence of counsel in the negotiations; the relative degrees
of bargaining power; the purpose of the challenged provision; the
lease's imposition of unreasonable burdens on those financially ill-
equipped to handle them;9' and the nature of the lease document itself,
i e., whether it is an "unduly harsh, boiler-plate lease."' g Although few
cases to date have applied or relied on this section,93 it has the potential
to broadly extend the doctrine of unconscionability in landlord-tenant
law.94
D. New York's Real Property Law Section 235-c
The New York legislature, in adding section 235-c9 5 to its Real Prop-
erty Law in 1976,96 essentially adopted section 2-302 of the UCC. 9 7 As
discriminatory basis) disregard and do not enforce the agreement or provision in actual
operations under the lease or, in the case of a landlord, under similar leases;
(6) Whether and to what extent the agreement or provision (especially if it relates to
low or moderate income residential property) imposes unreasonable liabilities or bur-
dens on persons who are financially ill-equipped to assume those burdens and who may
have had significant inequality of bargaining power, and
(7) Whether and to what extent the parties were each represented by counsel in the
course of negotiating the lease.
90. Id. Factor (2), see note 89 supra, states that when dealing with commercial properties,
large parts of a building, or large estates, freedom of negotiation is usually permissible. Although
this factor does not preclude use of the doctrine in commercial contexts, it does suggest that a
commercial tenant might bear a heavier burden of proof in arguing against enforcement of all or
part of the lease.
91. See note 89 supra. Factor (6), which refers to unreasonable burdens or liabilities imposed
on parties with relatively less bargaining power, is tied directly to the tenant'sfinancial capacity to
bear what is imposed. Although this factor might easily cover exculpation and indemnification
clauses, attorney fees, and the like, it apparently would not cover such provisions as confession-of-
judgment clauses or unduly restrictive rules and regulations.
92. See note 89 supra (factor 4).
93. See note 156 infra.
94. The last cited factor, whether the clause is contained in an "unduly harsh, boiler-plate
lease," could support a broad extension of the use of unconscionability in landlord-tenant law if it
is heavily weighted by the courts.
95. 49 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-c (McKinney Supp. 1978).
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease or any clause of the lease to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease, or it
may enforce the remainder of the lease without the unconscionable clause, or it may so
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that a lease or any clause thereof may
be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evi-
dence as to its setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Id.
96. The statute was enacted on July 26, 1976, and is applied retroactively. 1976 N.Y. Laws
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is true with section 2-302,98 section 235-c requires a hearing at which
the party claiming unconscionability has the burden of establishing the
setting, purpose, and effect of the lease to aid the court in its determina-
tion of the issue.99 Unlike other codifications of unconscionability, the
235-c provision is applicable to both commercial and residential
leases. 100
In residential lease cases, however, New York courts have not been
quick to use 235-c to find unconscionability. In Lefrak v. Lambert''
the court originally refused to enforce as "unconscionable on its face" a
clause'0 2 that allowed the landlord to recover more than the unavoida-
ble consequences of early abandonment by the tenant. 3 The court,
ch. 828, § 2 provides: "This act shall take effect immediately and shall be applicable to all leases,
regardless of when executed."
97. Flar v. Herrmann, 90 Misc. 2d 434, 436, 395 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
Governor Carey, in a memo of approval, noted the purpose of applying unconscionability to
landlord and tenant proceedings:
The concept of unconscionability is not new to the law of this state. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code, at the time of its enactment in 1962, codified the doctrine as it related to
the law of sales. It has, however, had limited applicability in landlord and tenant dis-
putes until recently. The doctrine is only now beginning to be judicially applied in such
cases .... This bill would codify the doctrine and establish a defense of unconsciona-
bility in landlord and tenant proceedings.
Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 203-04, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (Civ. Ct. 1976) (citations omit-
ted), modfied, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1978). The purpose of § 235-c is to
"engraft the spirit of the Uniform Commercial Code into landlord and tenant relationships and to
mandate a judicial policing against unconscionable results without strained construction of legal
principles." Pine Top Assocs. v. Hirsch & Sons Deli World, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 470, 472, 400
N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
98. See note 72 supra.
99. Flam v. Herrmann, 90 Misc. 2d 434, 436, 395 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
100. For cases dealing with the provision in a commercial context, see Pine Top Assocs. v.
Hirsch & Sons Deli World, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 470, 400 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Graft v.
Transitube, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 879, 396 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Civ. Ct. 1977); Flam v. Herrmann, 90 Misc.
2d 434, 395 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Civ. Ct. 1977). See also Valley Forge Village v. Anthony, 92 Misc. 2d
1007, 401 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Suffolk County Ct.) (§ 235-c does not apply to oral month-to-month
tenancies), af'd, 96 Misc. 2d 62, 40 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
101. 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. Ct. 1976).
102. One of New York's largest apartment owners asserted this clause after the apartment
abandoned by the tenant remained vacant for seventeen months. See generally note 37 supra and
accompanying text.
103. 89 Misc. 2d at 202, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 962. The court noted the inequality of bargaining
power and, more importantly, the absence of any legitimate reason for leases to be governed by
rules different from those that govern contracts in general. Id. Further, the court reasoned:
"There is something basically unjust, basically unreasonable and, therefore, basically not legal
about a landlord in an urban society with a housing shortage having no obligation to try to rerent
an apartment and mitigate damages." Id. at 205, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
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however, later modified this result 1°4 and permitted recovery of the full
amount due under the lease because it found the landlord had made
reasonable efforts to relet.105 Section 235-c apparently remains avail-
able for restricting enforcement of clauses like that in Lefrak when no
reasonable attempt is made by the landlord to relet. This court, how-
ever, refrained from deciding whether, as a general rule, the statute
mandated that landlords attempt to relet abandoned premises to re-
cover the full lease amount.10 6
Other 235-c cases also have rejected claims of unconscionability.
The trial court in Pine Hill Association v. Malveaux10 7 invoked section
235-c to refuse enforcement of a clause allowing the landlord, without
liability, to "immediately re-enter . . . and remove all persons and
property thereon, either by summary dispossess proceedings . . . by
force or otherwise" upon the tenant's default in rent payment. 08 Be-
cause of the illegality of forceful reentry and in the absence of any au-
thority permitting peaceful reentry while the tenant remained in
possession, the trial court reasoned that the clause was unconscionable
and, therefore, unenforceable as a matter of law.'09 The appellate
term" reversed the trial court, however, holding peaceful reentry per-
missible if the lease provides for peaceful reentry and the tenant fails,
after demand by the landlord, to pay the rent."'
In another New York case, Koslowski v. Palmieri,"2 the trial court
refused to find unconscionable a form lease provision waiving the ten-
ant's right to a jury trial. Although the clause was printed in type
smaller than normally permitted," 3 the court found the print legible
104. Lefrak v. Lambert, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
105. Id. at 633, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
106. Accord, Birchwood Assocs. v. Stein, 88 Misc. 2d 937, 938, 390 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (Sup. Ct.
1976), citedin Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197,204 & n.1, 403 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963-64 & n.1 (Civ.
CL 1976), modfed, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 403 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
107. 89 Misc. 2d 234, 391 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Yonkers City Ct. 1977).
108. Id. at 236, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 60. After the tenant defaulted in rent payments, the landlord
changed the locks on the apartment while the tenant was away and refused to allow the tenant to
reenter.
109. The court found that "actual possession shall not be disturbed except by legal process."
Id. at 237, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 60. The court envisioned a situation in which the landlord could
reenter at anytime of the day or night when the tenant was but one minute deficient in payment.
110. Pine Hill Assocs. v. Malveaux, 93 Misc. 2d 63, 403 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Yonkers City Ct. 1978).
111. Id.
112. 94 Misc. 2d 555, 404 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Civ. Ct. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 98 Misc. 2d
885, 414 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Term 1979).
113. The appellate term reversed, 98 Misc. 2d 885, 414 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1979), refusing
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and, therefore, not unconscionable. As to the substance of the clause,
the court balanced the consequences of enforcement and found no real
prejudice to the tenant, noting that the clause offered the advantages of
less delay and lower trial costs. 114
Only one New York court has found a lease unconscionable under
section 235-c. In Sidnam v. Washington Square Reafty Corp.,' 5 the ap-
pellate term restricted the application of an agreement to lease, which
had been executed through a broker. The landlord asserted that the
agreement allowed him to retain the prospective tenant's rent and se-
curity deposit, even though the lease was never signed." 6 Noting that
brokers were more like agents of the landlord than of the tenant in a
tight housing market and that clauses like the one in question had been
held under some circumstances to be only offers to lease subject to ac-
ceptance by the tenant, the court concluded that the "situation is one
which cries out for the invocation of section 235-c."" 7
Although the New York courts rejected the application of unconscio-
nability to clauses denying the right to a jury trial, permitting reentry
while the tenant remained in possession, and granting the landlord re-
covery of more than unavoidable damages, unconscionability is clearly
not a dead-letter doctrine. The courts will probably continue to invoke
the doctrine to disallow retention of rental deposits provided for in
lease applications and in situations similar to those finding unconscio-
nability under the equitable doctrine." 8
E. The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA) is a
comprehensive statute regulating many aspects of residential" 9 lease
law. Although section 1-303120 of the URLTA closely parallels the lan-
to enforce the clause because of its small print size. The court did not consider the unconsciona-
bility claim.
114. Id.
115. 95 Misc. 2d 825, 408 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 827, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
118. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
119. URLTA is applicable only to residential leases. Commissioners' Comment, URLTA,
supra note 9, at § 1.101.
120. Id. § 1.303 provides:
(a) If the court, as a matter of law, finds
(1) a rental agreement or any provision thereof was unconscionable when made, the
court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement with-
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guage of section 2-302 of the UCC, its coverage also extends to settle-
ments of claims.' 2' Sixteen states have adopted the Act,' 22 twelve of
which have adopted the unconscionability provision. 123
URLTA directly regulates many of the substantive lease clauses that
courts might otherwise readily refuse to enforce on unconscionability
or public policy grounds.'24 URLTA prohibits waivers of rights and
remedies granted by the Act, use of confession-of-judgment clauses,
out the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscionable provi-
sion to avoid an unconscionable result; or
(2) a settlement in which a party waives or agrees to forego a claim or right under
this Act or under a rental agreement was unconscionable when made, the court may
refuse to enforce the settlement, enforce the remainder of the settlement without the
unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscionable provision to
avoid an unconscionable result.
(b) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by the court upon its own motion
the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the set-
ting, purpose, and effect of the rental agreement or settlement to aid the court in making
the determination.
121. Id.
122. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010-.380 (1974); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1301 to -1381
(1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5101-6504 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-.73 (West Supp.
1979); HAwAI REV. STAT. §§ 521-1 to -76 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 562A.1-.37 (Supp.
1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540 to -2573 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 383-505 to -715
(Baldwin 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 42-401 to -442 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 76-1401 to -1449 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-7-1 to -51 (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 5321.01-.19 (Page Supp. 1978); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 91.700-.865 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 64-2801 to -2864 (1976); VA. CODE §§ 55-248.2-.40 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 59.18.010-.900 (Supp. 1978).
123. Four states, Alaska, Delaware, Virginia, and Washington, substantially adopted
URLTA, supra note 9, but did not enact its unconscionability provision. Enacted unconscionabil-
ity provisions are codified at: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1312 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.45
(West Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-75 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58.2544 (1976);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.555 (Baldwin 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 42-411 (Cum. Supp.
1977); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1412 (1976); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.14 (Page Supp. 1978);
OR. REV. STAT. § 91.735 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64.2814 (1976). New Mexico has codified
essentially the same concept in its "inequitable agreement provision," N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-12
(Supp. 1975).
Not all states adopting the unconscionability provision enacted the settlement section; some
states adopted provisions essentially like U.C.C. § 2-302. Florida, Nebraska, and Ohio omit
URLTA § 1.303(a)(2).
124. See generally Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Programfor Achieving Real Ten-
ant Goals, I1 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1976); Note, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Arizona's Ver-
sion ofthe Uniform Act, 16 ARIz. L. REv. 79 (1974); Comment, The Kentucky Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act Tenants' New Lease on LffeZ 14 J. FAM. L. 597 (1975-76); Note, The
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Facilitation of Or Impediment to Reform Favorable
to the Tenant, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 845 (1974). See also Report o/Subcom. on the Model
Landlord-Tenant Act of Comm on Leases, Proposed Unform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 3. 104 (1973).
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agreements to pay attorney's fees, and exculpation and indemnification
clauses."z5 If the landlord, aware of the prohibition, continues to in-
clude the clauses in the lease, the tenant may recover up to three
months' rent and reasonable attorney's fees.' 26 URLTA also proscribes
landlords from taking a lien or security interest in a tenant's household
goods, abolishes distraint for rent, 2 7 and stipulates and regulates land-
lord obligations, 2 1 including the obligation to maintain the prem-
ises.'2 9 In addition, the Act limits the amount and use of security
deposits, 130 requires that the landlord's rules and regulations be reason-
able,' and prohibits retaliatory action.' 32 Finally, URLTA breaks
with common law by making the landlord's full recovery for early
abandonment contingent upon a bona fide attempt to relet the premises
on the tenant's behalf. 33
This broad, direct regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship
should narrow the role of unconscionability within the Act, but the
scope of its use is unsure because only one reported case to date con-
strues section 1-303. In Zemp v. Rowland14 the tenant's form lease re-
quired payment of a nonrefundable fee equal to one month's rent in
exchange for the right to terminate, without additional liability, on
thirty-days notice. '3  The lease terms, however, also granted tenants
the last month rent-free if the tenants remained the full term.136 Al-
though the landlord quickly secured another tenant after the original
125. URLTA, supra note 9, at § 1.403.
126. Id
127. Id at § 4.205.
128. Id at §§ 2.101-.105.
129. See id. at § 2.104. If the landlord fails to supply essential services, the tenant has re-
course through special remedies provided in the Act. Id at § 4.104.
130. Id at § 2.101. This section stipulates that the amount of the deposit may not exceed one
month's rent. It allows the landlord to set off any damages from that amount, but requires the
landlord to give an itemized list of damages to the tenant. Kentucky enacted a much stricter
version of this section. Id. at § 2.10 1, Commentary. Kentucky requires, among other things, that
security deposits be kept in a separate bank account of which tenant knows the location and
number, that the landlord list existing damage and prepare the list for signature by the tenant, that
the landlord may not retain any portion of the deposit if he fails to keep a separate account, and
that only the portion of the deposit that compensates for damages or early abandonment be re-
tained in any event.
131. Id at § 3.102.
132. Id at § 5.101.
133. Id at § 4.203.
134. 31 Or. App. 1105, 572 P.2d 637 (1977).
135. Id. at 1107, 572 P.2d at 638.
136. Id. at 1108 n.1, 572 P.2d at 638 n.l.
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tenants' early termination, he refused to refund the fee.' 37 The Oregon
appellate court reversed the trial court's finding of unconscionability t38
on the ground that the fee neither violated any specific provision of the
Act nor constituted either liquidated damages or a security deposit;
rather, the fee was consideration for the right to terminate early. In the
court's opinion, the clause presented a reasonable allocation of risk and
resulted from free bargaining between the parties. 39
IV. THE UNCONSCIONABILITY TEST IN THE CONTEXT OF
RESIDENTIAL LEASES
Perhaps the most influential factor affecting the application of un-
conscionability is the test used to judge the enforceability of leases.
Without a clear standard, lawyers and judges uncertain of its meaning
may be hesitant to apply the doctrine or may apply it in inconsistent
ways. The particular test used also will determine by its strictness the
ease with which tenants may successfully assert the defense. Uncon-
scionability has proved to be a tool of limited usefulness to consumers
in contract law,14° probably because of the contract-law test for uncon-
scionability. This section examines the contract-law test for unconscio-
137. The tenants gave proper notice and quit the premises early. Five days later the landlord
rerented to other tenants. The landlord returned a pro rata amount of that month's rent to the
tenants, retaining an amount to compensate for the days unrented. In a strict sense, then, the
landlord suffered no damage from the early termination. Id. at 1107, 572 P.2d at 639.
138. Id. at 1110, 572 P.2d at 640.
139. Id. at 1109-10, 572 P.2d at 639-40. The tenants contended that they were told the amount
was prepayment of the last month's rent. As evidence of their contention, the tenants pointed out
that the space provided for the nonrefundable fee was left blank and that the only mention of the
fee appeared under the title "Monthly Lease Payments." Id. at 1110 n.3, 572 P.2d at 639 n.3. The
appellate court, however, accepted the trial court's determination that the parties contemplated the
fee as a part of their bargain.
The dissent argued that the lease was misleading and unconscionable as a matter of law. It was
a poorly reproduced form contract on two legal-sized pages of single-spaced type. Id. at 1111, 572
P.2d at 640. The dissenting judge also did not accept the trial court's determination that the
tenants understood the provision. Further, he maintained that the lease tended to conceal the
provision and mislead the tenants because the space provided for the nonrefundable fee was blank
but an amount was stipulated for monthly payments. Id. at 1112-13, 572 P.2d at 641. He con-
cluded: "The pages of history record the upheavals that stem from oppressive landlord tactics,
The effort of the legislature to eliminate 'unconscionability' in leases between residential tenants
and landlords is subverted by the majority opinion." Id. at 1113-14, 572 P.2d at 641.
140. See note 170 infra.
For a general discussion of unconscionability under U.C.C. § 2-302, see J. WHiTE & R. SUM-
MaRS, supra note 72, at 112; Ellinghaus, stura note 72; The Emperorr' New Clause, supra note 72;
The Common Law Tradiioan, supra note 72; Murray, supra note 72; Speidel, supra note 72.
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nability, its application in landlord-tenant law, and the probable effect
of the test on the doctrine's application to residential leases.
A. The Test and its Source. UCC Section 2-302
In seeking guidance for the application of unconscionability to resi-
dential leases, courts and legislatures looked to the contract-law test
developed under UCC section 2-302, the doctrine's first major codifica-
tion. 41 The test as stated in UCC section 2-302 and appropriate com-
ments, however, does not set a standard for courts to follow; 42 nor does
the section define the concept, 143 except that "the principle is one of the
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise."'"
Over time a body of contract case law emerged to fill the definitional
void left by the UCC. The leading opinion,145  Williams v. Walker-
141. Because both equitable and statutory unconscionability principles originated in contract
law and the modem approach views leases as contracts, it is understandable that courts turned to
contract law as the source for the doctrine's test. Furthermore, the commentary to the Restate-
ment unconscionability provision piovides: "The Uniform Commercial Code gives statutory au-
thority to policing action by courts of unconscionable agreements (see § 2-302) in sales contracts
.... The rule of this section extends the concept to leases." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY § 5.6, Reporter's Note. The commentary then cites the New York cases that have applied
unconscionability to leases. Id. Moreover, the Commissioner's Comment to URLTA § 1.303
states that the section is "adapted from the Uniform Commercial Code" and states a test that
closely follows the UCC commentary test of "so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the agreement or settlement." URLTA, supra
note 9, at § 1.303, Commissioners' Comment. The only reported case to examine the doctrine
found § 1.303's test to be "substantially the same test as provided in the comments to the uncon-
scionability section of the Uniform Commercial Code .... The comments to § 2-302 ... state
that the main thrust of the unconscionability section is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise."
Zemp v. Rowland, 31 Or. App. 1105, 1109, 572 P.2d 637, 639 (1977).
142. The code section itself merely states the potential consequences of a finding of
unconscionability and mandates a hearing on the issue. See note 72 supra. The commentary to
§ 2-302 defines the time of contract formation as the relevant reference point for determination
and focuses on the specific parties in their particular circumstances. The test is stated as "whether,
in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances ex-
isting at the time of the making of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1 (1962 version).
143. Kirby, supra note 13, at 220; see The Emperor's New Clause, supra note 72, at 487 ("If
reading this section makes anything clear it is that this section alone makes nothing clear about
the meaning of 'unconscionable' except perhaps that it is perjorative."); id. at 499 ("By 1952 un-
conscionability was defined in terms of itself."); Berger, supra note 25 at 812 ("In short, 2-302 is
not one of the drafting successes of the Uniform Commercial Code. Whatever 'unconscionability'
means must be found outside Section 2-302."). But see Ellinghaus, supra note 72, at 814-15.
144. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1 (1962 version).
145. For cases citing the Williams test, see Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F.
Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 377 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Ala.
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Thomas Furniture Co.,'46 developed a two-prong test that required
plaintiffs to demonstrate "an absence of meaningful choice" and con-
tract terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger of the parties to the
contract.147 Other courts, applying essentially the same test, required
the party asserting unconscionability to demonstrate both procedural
and substantive unconscionability.t18 Procedural unconscionability de-
pends on the knowledge and experience of the particular parties, their
relative bargaining power, their relative control over terms and condi-
tions of the contract, the extent of actual bargaining, and the availabil-
ity of similar goods from other sources. Substantive unconscionability
turns on the reasonableness of the specific contract terms in the individ-
1974); Rodriguez v. Nachamie, 57 A.D.2d 920, 395 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1977); Brooklyn Union Gas Co.
v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civ. Ct. 1975); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78
Misc. 2d 647, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Civ. Ct. 1974); Lamoille Grain Co. v. St. Johnsbury, 369 A.2d
1389 (Vt. 1976).
146. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
147. Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaning-
ful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unrea-
sonably favorable to the other party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a
particular case can only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by
a gross inequality of bargaining power. The manner in which the contract was entered is
also relevant to this consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvi-
ous education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by
deceptive sales practices? Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowl-
edge of its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bar-
gain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a
commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, if is hardly
likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given
to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of an agreement are not to be
questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the
contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.
Id. at 449-50.
148. Procedural unconscionability refers to the first prong of the Walker-Thomas test--"ab-
sence of meaningful choice"--and substantive unconscionability refers to the second prong-
"contract terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 72, at 117. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Inter-
state Security Police v. Citizens & S. Emory Bank, 237 Ga. 37, 226 S.E.2d 583 (1976); Heller & Co.
v. Convalescent Home, 49 Ill. App. 3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977); Bunge Corp. v. Williams, 45
Ill. App. 3d 359, 359 N.E.2d 844 (1977); Wade v. Austin, 524 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1975); Younger, A
Judge's Kew of Unconscionabti y, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 348 (1973). This distinction first appeared in The
Emperor's New Clause, supra note 72, at 487. "[S]ome of these defenses have to do with the
process of contracting and others have to do with the resulting contract." Id. (emphasis in origi-
nal) See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Wade v. Austin,
524 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Trex. 1975); note 147 supra.
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ual contract setting. 149
B. Application of the Unconscionabiliy Test to Residential Leases
Most courts that have applied unconscionability to residential leases
did not explicitly detail the relevant test factors, but merely stated that
they were applying "the test" as developed in contract law and under
the UCC.t50 In a number of the landlord-tenant cases, however, the
courts demonstrated an awareness of the contract-law test by expres-
sing a concern with both the procedural and substantive elements pres-
ent in their particular fact situations. The court in Weaver v. American
Oil Co., 15 for example, acknowledged the basic unfairness of exculpa-
tion clauses, particularly when added to the already burdensome obli-
gations imposed upon the lessee.152 The Weaver court also noted as
specific procedural problems the lessee's lack of education, his failure
to read and understand the lease terms, the basic inequality of bargain-
ing power existing between the parties, and the unbargained nature of
the form lease.
153
That other courts, in finding no evidence of unconscionability, em-
phasized the absence of both procedural and substantive factors pro-
vides further evidence of the pervasiveness of the two-pronged test.
154
149. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Wade v. Austin,
524 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. 1975).
150. See note 141 supra; see, e.g., Zemp v. Rowland, 31 Or. App. 1105, 1109,572 P.2d 637, 639
(1977).
151. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); see note 77 supra and accompanying text.
152. 257 Ind. at 462, 276 N.E.2d at 146-47.
153. Id See also Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apartments Section 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1097,
359 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Civ. Ct. 1974); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Civ.
Ct. 1973), repdon other grounds, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1974). The courts referred to both
the unfairness of disclaiming liability and the lack of meaningful choice. See note 80 supra.
154. In Zemp v. Rowland, 31 Or. App. 1105, 572 P.2d 637 (1977), the court, in rejecting un-
conscionability, noted that the lease arrangement represented a reasonable allocation of risks and
was the result of free and open bargaining. Id. at 1109-10, 572 P.2d at 639-40. In upholding a
waiver of 30-days notice for failure to comply with the lease provisions, the court in Jones v.
Sheetz, 242 A.2d 208 (D.C. 1968), held the waiver fair because its use was conditioned upon the
tenant's failure to comply. Further, evidence of the tenant's occupancy of the leased property for
several years and his completion of law school supported a finding of no procedural unconsciona-
bility.
This consistent adherence to the two-pronged test may explain the failure of several courts to
find certain clauses unconscionable as a matter of law. When faced with a list ofclauses typical of
Pennsylvania form leases, for example, the court in Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties,
Inc., 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974), refused to hold them unconscionable as a matter of law because
each individual provision had been previously enforced under existing law. This decision recog-
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Similarly, section 5.6 of the Restatement (Second) of Property,'" ac-
knowledges both the procedural and substantive requirements, com-
bining elements of both in its guideline provisions. 156
Acknowledging a uniform test, however, is only the first step, for the
relative weight accorded to each of the possible facts necessary to the
fulfillment of both prongs of the test has a substantial impact on
achieving an effective and generally applicable test for unconscionabil-
ity.
C. Effect of the Unconscionability Test on Residential Leasing Law
Contract law recognizes as important components of procedural un-
conscionability the relative bargaining power and sophistication of the
parties, the actual opportunity for bargaining, the alternatives open to
the parties, and the parties' opportunity to understand the contractual
terms. 57 These same factors have led courts to designate the modern
form lease as an adhesion contract.'-" By definition, therefore, the
modem lessee is often faced with an absence of meaningful choice.
Many courts appear to have at least implicitly recognized this. In
upholding a finding of unconscionability, courts generally emphasize
the lack of adequate housing and the adhesive nature of form leases as
the most important, if not sole, evidence of procedural unfairness.'59
Without reference to the particular characteristics of the parties to the
transaction, these courts follow a pattern of alleging unconscionability
in general terms based upon the absence of meaningful choice. The
following market description offered by one court, and shared by
nizes the importance of the procedural aspect; substantive clauses that are unconscionable in some
procedural fact situations will not necessarily constitute overreaching in other fact situations.
155. See notes 88-94 supra and accompanying text.
156. One of the few reported cases to cite § 5.6 is Spallone v. Siegel, 239 Pa. Super. 586, 599,
362 A.2d 263, 271 (1976) (Spaeth, J., in support of per curiam reversal). Judge Spaeth explained
that although exculpation clauses are presumed invalid, the landlord can overcome the presump-
tion by demonstrating that the lease resulted from deliberate bargaining. The relative economic
powers of the parties, the bargaining history, the extent to which each party was represented by
counsel, and the nature of the lease document are some of the factors relevant to determining the
absence of adhesion and the presence of bargaining in fact. Thus, the two-pronged test of Wil-
liams is used to apply the provisions of § 5.6 of the Restatement.
157. See notes 147, 149 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., McClelland-Metz Management, Inc. v. Faulk, 86 Misc. 2d 778, 384 N.Y.S.2d
919 (Nassau County Ct. 1976); Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apartments Section 5, Inc., 78 Misc.
2d 1097,359 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Civ. Ct. 1974); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136
(Civ. Ct. 1973), rev'don other grounds, 77 Misc. 2d 774, 357 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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many, is illustrative of this presumption, which might in fact be termed
a "conclusive presumption":
Unfortunately the limited residential real estate market in New York
City, especially Manhattan, allows no such freedom of choice. There is in
fact a gross inequality of bargaining power which gives rise to standard-
ized lease forms with some terms unreasonably favorable to the land-
lord. . . . The residential real estate market leaves no meaningful choice
for a tenant and does not provide him with opportunities to bargain for
reasonable terms and to avoid adhesive clauses .... Where clauses in
form leases of this type are unreasonably weighted in favor of the land-
lord, they may be subject to the defense of unconscionability and denied
enforcement. 6°
The courts' tendency to presume the absence of meaningful choice in
the residential lease setting is considerably more significant than it first
appears. An examination of alternatives to this presumption illustrates
that the approach used in finding procedural unconscionability directly
160. Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apartments Section 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1097, 1099, 359
N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (Civ. Ct. 1974). Another court's emotional statement lends additional evidence
to this tendency to find that the market setting makes the lease per se procedurally unconsciona-
ble.
Given the overwhelming need for housing, the respondents must do exactly as the
petitioner demands, or shelter will be denied. Had petitioner demanded that the respon-
dents fall to their knees and grovel before him, the respondents perforce would have
swallowed their pride and done so, or be condemned to remain outside, never to come in
from the cold. Here the petitioner demanded that the respondents grovel not physically,
but legally. The petitioner's unbargainable price is that the respondents agree to clause
after clause of terms to the excessive benefit of the petitioner.
Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 332, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681,687 (Rockland County Ct.), aff'd,
84 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1975). The court in Galligan v. Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301,
304, 209 A.2d 463, 465 (1966), in ruling on an exculpation clause, similarly noted that every lease
contained such clauses. Thus, the court noted it would have been fruitless for the tenant to seek a
lease without one. The court saw this lack of bargaining power as indicative of an adhesion
contract.
But see Mury v. Tublitz, 151 NJ. Super. 39, 376 A.2d 547 (App. Div. 1977). The Mury court
refused to find that the residential housing situation alone warrants a finding of procedural uncon-
scionability.
The primary issue before us arises from the trial judge's expressed concept that public
policy proscribes the enforcement of provisions in a "typical" landlord-tenant contract or
lease because it would be unreasonable to do so. We disagree with that concept. Appar-
ently it stems from the judge's private view. No authority is mentioned. Although where
suitable housing quarters are at a premium a court may hold that exculpatory lease pro-
visions are invalid, because of the unequal bargaining positions of the parties. . . this is
not to say that every lease provision favorable to the landlord is against public policy.
There is nothing in the record ... which warrants a factual finding that the parties
were in unequal bargaining positions when the lease was executed.
Id at 43-44, 376 A.2d at 549.
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affects the scope of application of the unconscionability doctrine and
resultant findings.
Instead of conclusively presuming the absence of meaningful choice
in the residential lease setting, the courts can evaluate the effect of the
general market setting on unconscionability in any one of three
ways. 161 The first alternative focuses not on the tenant's ability to ob-
tain alternate terms, but on the tenant's fair opportunity to know and
understand the terms; 162 this "unfair surprise" test thus leaves the par-
ties free to contract. A second approach, a derivative of the unconscio-
nability test as it developed under contract law, requires a case-by-case
analysis balancing all relevant procedural facts.' 63 This approach may
result in the identical substantive clause being enforced in one case,
limited in another, or voided in a third case, all by the same court, t64
depending on the differing procedural contexts of the cases. The third
alternative raises a rebuttable presumption that the present market situ-
ation precludes bargaining and meaningful choice. 165 These alterna-
tives differ from each other only in the relative weight each accords to
the market setting.
A positive correlation exists between the weight a court accords to
161. Yet another approach builds on the idea that a "class of tenants" should be protected.
See, eg., Graziano v. Tortora Agency, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1094, 1096, 359 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (Civ.
Ct. 1974); Seabrook v. Commuter Hous., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 10, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67, 71 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
The ignorant and the indigent would fall into this class. If, however, educated and nonindigent
tenants are unable to obtain different terms, there is little reason to draw a class that excludes
them.
162. This alternative is analogous to the "affirmative duty" approach. See notes 69-71 supra
and accompanying text.
163. The commentary to ULRTA § 1.303 emphasizes the varying impact that the particular
facts may have on the procedural setting:
The basic test is whether, in light of the background and setting of the market, the condi-
tions of the particular parties to the rental agreement, settlement or waiver of right or
claim are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the agreement or settlement. Thus, the particular facts involved in
each case are of utmost importance since unconscionability may exist in some situations
but not in others.
URLTA, supra note 9, at § 1.303, Commissioners' Comment 517 (1978).
164. See Mury v. Tublitz, 151 N.J. Super. 39, 43-44, 376 A.2d 547, 549 (App. Div. 1977); note
159 supra. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971), also exemplifies this
approach. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
165. A similar approach may have been endorsed in Spallone v. Siegel, 239 Pa. Super. 586,
599, 362 A.2d 263, 271 (1976) (Spaeth, J., in support of per curiam reversal). Although the Spaeth
opinion based its presumption of invalidity on the presence of a particular substantive clause, it
found that the clause could be enforced only upon a showing by the landlord that the contract was
the result of deliberate bargaining.
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the generally recognized adhesive market setting and the degree of dif-
ficulty a tenant encounters in demonstrating unconscionability. The
test focusing on unfair surprise works specifically to the landlord's ad-
vantage, for demonstrating affirmative apprisal of a term is sufficient to
bar a tenant's claim. Furthermore, landlords may quickly and easily
devise a new, more explicit lease form to frustrate any possibility of a
showing of unconscionability. The case-by-case approach, although al-
lowing the tenant to show that bargaining-even with full knowledge-
may be essentially futile, places an excessively heavy burden on the
tenant. The tenant may have difficulty demonstrating facts such as the
unavailability of alternative housing-a showing essential to a finding
of unconscionability. In that situation the court may look to factors
defeated by a market without alternatives, such as the wealth, experi-
ence, or intelligence of the tenant. Moreover, the lack of a definite
standard may lead to differing rulings by courts on similar substantive
provisions, creating a situation in which the tenant is unable to rely on
prior cases to determine his legal position and frame his arguments.
Application of the conclusive and rebuttable presumptions signifi-
cantly lessen the tenant's burden of proof. To show an absence of
meaningful choice, the tenant need only demonstrate a shortage of ade-
quate housing in the area and the use of a form lease. The procedural
requirement then ceases to be a barrier; the tenant need only convince
the court of the substantive unreasonableness of particular terms or
conditions.
What weight, if any, is accorded the general market setting, also af-
fects the consistency of the case law, which, in turn, influences the will-
ingness of both lawyers and judges to use the doctrine of
unconscionability. The conclusive and rebuttable presumption ap-
proaches lead to greater consistency because the major focus shifts
from the multi-faceted procedural aspects of the unconscionability test
to the relatively unchanging substantive provisions. The unfair sur-
prise test also encourages consistency, but does so only by allowing
market forces to control the substantive provisions. The case-by-case
approach obviously results in inconsistency and makes predictability
difficult.
Finally, the four different approaches represent different conceptions
of both the doctrine of unconscionability and the market setting. The
unfair surprise test of procedural unconscionability either assumes an
idyllic but unrealistic concept of the free market or chooses to ignore
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the effect of market imperfections. If the purpose of applying the un-
conscionability doctrine to residential leases is to restore a balance be-
tween lessors and lessees, this test must be abandoned.
Both the case-by-case and the rebuttable presumption tests assume
that the market generally works, but that it breaks down in certain ar-
eas. The only difference between the two approaches is their designa-
tion of which party bears the burden of showing unconscionability.
These tests remain true to the contract-law rule that both substantive
and procedural unconscionability must be shown before the court will
use its power to balance the lease terms.
A conclusive presumption of the absence of meaningful choice in the
residential lease setting makes unwarranted assumptions about the
marketplace. It precludes the possibility of enforcing certain clauses by
assuming that tenants are not free to negotiate. By placing all tenants
in a protective category, the courts covertly decide that certain substan-
tive terms are unenforceable in all residential leases. This role would
be more appropriately and effectively left to the legislature.
The rebuttable presumption approach to procedural unconscionabil-
ity provides the best method for controlling the present inequities in the
residential rental market. It eases the burden placed on the tenant by
making a demonstration of unconscionability a true possibility. It also
leads to a more consistent body of case law, which allows courts and
lawyers to apply the doctrine with confidence in its predictability. Fi-
nally, the rebuttable presumption achieves these goals without signifi-
cantly changing the doctrine's test or assuming that the tenant cannot
protect himself under any circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION: THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
The modem tenant may be characterized as a consumer contracting
for a life necessity within a market structure that often does not present
a meaningful choice. The unconscionability doctrine provides a signifi-
cant aid in assuring a fair balance of rights and obligations between
tenant and landlord in residential leases. Several factors, however, limit
its effective and widespread application. Because most applications of
the doctrine use a case-by-case approach, problems of consistency limit
the doctrine's utility.'66 Other limitations result from the prevalent pat-
166. See note 165 supra and accompanying text. Use of the doctrine fails to put tenants on
notice of their rights by virtue of the litigation of other tenants; similarly, this use encourages
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tern of remedying unconscionability. Once unconscionability has been
shown, courts may refuse to enforce not only the objectionable clause,
but the entire agreement as well. 167 The prevalent response however,
has been to refuse enforcement of only the offensive clause; 68 thus, the
landlord loses nothing by the inclusion of an objectionable clause. 169
Consequently, this use of the doctrine affords little preventative aid for
an unwary tenant and limits relief to an after-the-fact lawsuit applica-
ble only to the parties before the court.
A rebuttable presumption of unconscionability, coupled with a will-
ingness by the courts to extend enforcement beyond the objectionable
clause when the facts indicate knowing abuse, would go far in solving
the problems. In addition, use of the rebuttable presumption would
increase the availability and effectiveness of the unconscionability doc-
trine and save it from fading into disuse as it has under contract law
concerning consumer protection in sales.' 7
Unconscionability should not be used, however, to supplant legisla-
landlords to retain the same lease even after provisions have been held unconscionable, for it
becomes easy to distinguish prior cases construing the same clause.
167. See notes 72, 88, 95, 120 supra.
168. See, e.g., Bernard v. Kuha, 90 Misc. 2d 148, 394 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Rockland County Ct.
1977) (stipulation of legal fees of $I 10 unconscionable; clause unenforceable); McClelland-Metz
Management, Inc. v. Faulk, 86 Misc. 2d 778, 384 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Nassau County Ct. 1976) (provi-
sion requiring payment of attorneys' fees upon commencement of action unconscionable; clause
unenforceable); Avenue Assocs., Inc. v. Buxbaum, 83 Misc. 2d 134, 371 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Civ. Ct.)
(waiver of right to jury trial unconscionable; clause unenforceable), rev'd, 83 Misc. 2d 719 (Sup.
Ct. 1975); Groner v. Lakeview Management Corp., 83 Misc. 2d 932, 373 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct.
1975) (clause stipulating interruption or curtailment of services does not constitute constructive
eviction so as to allow set-off unconscionable and unenforceable; only six cents awarded because
tenant failed to prove damages); Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apartments Section 5, Inc., 78 Misc.
2d 1097, 359 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Civ. Ct. 1974) (disclaimer of liability for failure to provide air condi-
tioning unconscionable and unenforceable; tenants allowed to recover cost of renting air condi-
tioning); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Civ. Ct. 1974) (clause providing
interruption or curtailment of heat not constructive eviction so as to allow set-off unconscionable
and unenforceable; court to determine value of services and amount value of apartment reduced
as set-off).
169. If the tenant takes the issue to court and proves the claim-both of which are unlikely-
the court will merely refuse to enforce that provision; thus, landlords are usually not much worse-
off than if, knowing of the possibility of nonenforceability, they omitted the clause altogether.
170. An examination of cases applying UCC § 2-302 from 1972 to the present discloses that
courts rarely uphold the claim of unconscionability in consumer contracts for goods or services.
Cases applying § 2-302 to consumers have been limited for the most part to New York. See
Bogatz v. Case Catering Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 1052, 383 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Civ. Ct. 1976); Vom Lehm v.
Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 86 Misc. 2d 1, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Brooklyn Union Gas
Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 289 (Civ. Ct. 1975); Albert-Merrill School v.
Godoy, 78 Misc. 2d 647, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 378 (Civ. Ct. 1974); Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v.
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tive action. Even if the above suggestions were followed, the doctrine
alone could not effectively or quickly reshape the rights and obligations
between landlord and tenant. Many state legislatures have already
taken direct action to prohibit some of the most onerous prolandlord
lease provisions. 1 ' A growing minority have taken even more decisive
and direct approaches through comprehensive landlord-tenant legisla-
tion. 7 2 This approach, exemplified by URLTA, is not essential, but is
the most effective. Not only does URLTA, or URLTA-type legislation,
set clear standards of behavior and put all parties on notice of what is
acceptable,'73 but it also deters inclusion of prohibited terms. 74
The problems of unconscionability, however, do not totally emascu-
late its potential as a valuable aid to residential tenants both within and
without URLTA. First of all, if courts conclusively or rebuttably pre-
sume procedural unconscionability, tenants will have strong arguments
to void clauses presently enforced in jurisdictions not covered by
URLTA or similar statutes. Second, the unconscionability doctrine
serves as a stopgap means of dealing with new or newly recognized
substantive abuses pending legislative action. Third, courts can use un-
conscionability to deny enforcement of those borderline terms which,
although acceptable in some contexts, constitute oppression in certain
procedural settings. The two approaches, regulation and unconsciona-
bility, together can provide a more equitable balance between the mod-
em landlord and tenant.
Audrey Goldstein Fleissig
Becerra, 73 Misc. 2d 140, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Civ. Ct. 1973); Nosse v. Vulcan Basement Water-
proofing, Inc., 35 Ohio Misc. 1, 299 N.E.2d 708 (Euclid Mun. Ct. 1973).
171. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
172. See notes 119-24 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 124-33 supra and accompanying text.
174. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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